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The framework of a general equilibrium heterogeneous agent model is used to study the 
optimal design of an unemployment insurance scheme and the voting behaviour on 
unemployment policy reforms. Agents, who have a limited lifetime and participate in the 
labour market until they reach the retirement age, can either be employed or unemployed in 
each period of their working life. Unemployed agents receive job offers of different (match) 
qualities. Moreover, unemployed agents suffer a decline of their individual productivity 
during unemployment, whereas the productivity of employed agents increases over time. 
An optimal unemployment insurance scheme is one that maximizes the expected lifetime 
utility of a newly born agent. Two types of unemployment insurance are considered, one with 
defined benefits and one with defined replacement ratios. A numerical version of the model is 
calibrated to the German economy. 
The welfare maximising unemployment insurance system is determined in simulations. Under 
this optimal scheme, no payments are made to short-term unemployed agents. Long-term 
unemployed receive rather low (social assistance level) benefits, the optimal level of which 
depends on the assumed degree of risk aversion. Defined benefit systems provide a higher 
welfare than defined replacement ratios. 
Furthermore, the question is addressed whether the majority of population would support the 
optimal system given the status quo. It turns out that if voters can choose between keeping 
their current unemployment system and jumping to the equilibrium associated with the 
optimal policy, there is a slight majority of just above 50% for the optimal policy.  
Finally, a more realistic case is considered, in which voters do not choose between the long-
rung equilibria associated with policy changes, but take into account the transition process to 
the new equilibrium. As some of the relevant variables adjust very slowly to their new long-
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1. Introduction 
This paper explores the optimal design of an unemployment insurance scheme in the 
framework of a general equilibrium heterogeneous agents model. Agents, who have a limited 
lifetime and participate in the labour market until they reach the retirement age, can either be 
employed or unemployed in each period of their working life. Unemployed agents receive job 
offers of different (match) quality. Moreover, unemployed agents suffer a decline of their 
individual productivity during unemployment, whereas the productivity of employed agents 
increases over time. 
An optimal unemployment insurance scheme is one that maximizes the expected lifetime 
utility of an agent. Two types of unemployment insurance are considered, one with defined 
benefits and one with defined replacement ratios. The (constrained) optimal scheme is 
determined by simulating a version of the model calibrated to the German economy under 
different assumptions regarding risk aversion and the openness of the economy. 
Having obtained the optimal unemployment insurance systems, it is asked whether the switch 
from a the current more generous system to the optimal unemployment insurance would be 
supported by a majority of the voters. It turns out that if agents can choose between the steady 
state equilibria associated with the current and the optimal system, a close majority of the 
voters supports the optimal policy. 
Finally, the model is extended to allow for transitional dynamics after a change of the 
unemployment insurance system. Simulations show that the adjustment process to the new 
steady state equilibrium after a regime switch can take a long time. Taking into account these 
transitional dynamics when voting on unemployment insurance leads to results that can be 
very different from those obtained when agents simply choose between log-run equilibria. 
 
There is large and fast growing literature on the optimal design of unemployment insurance 
(UI) systems. One approach, pioneered by Shavell and Weiss (1979) and more recently 
adopted by Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), interprets UI design as a principal-agent problem. 
Optimal insurance designs are derived as second-best solutions in these models. 
Another strand of literature more closely related to this paper evaluates UI systems in the 
framework of more or less complicated general equilibrium models. As such models are often 
too complicated to allow for an exact analytical solution, usually different institutional 
arrangements are compared using simulation techniques. - 3 - 
Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) construct a general equilibrium model with search in which 
highly productive jobs are also riskier. They show analytically that under these circumstances, 
if agents are risk averse, maximal output is attained only with an unemployment insurance. 
Modelling an economy populated by liquidity constrained agents, Hansen and İmrohoroğlu 
(1992) study the consequences of moral hazard for optimal replacement ratios. They find that 
an optimal insurance has a relatively high benefit level to protect agents from large 
fluctuations of consumption. However, if moral hazard is introduced, replacement ratios at 
levels observed in reality may actually make the economy worse off than without any 
insurance at all.  
Frederiksson and Holmlund (1999) construct a model of job search abstracting from capital. 
They consider an unemployment insurance with two benefit levels and show that optimality 
requires the benefits to decline. In a calibrated version of their model they find significant 
welfare gains from switching from an optimal one-level to a two level benefit unemployment 
insurance. 
Costain (1999) incorporates stochastic job matches into a heterogeneous agents model. He 
only finds minor improvements of consumption smoothing with unemployment insurance. 
Also, the importance of moral hazard is relatively small. 
Using version of the Costain (1999) model calibrated to the German economy, Heer (2003)  
numerically obtains optimal replacement ratios. He finds that the optimal UI scheme involves 
full insurance during the first year of unemployment. This result is driven by the somewhat 
counterintuitive effect that increasing the replacement ratio during the first year of 
unemployment results in aggregate savings. 
Pallage and Zimmermann (2004) discuss the voting behaviour on UI systems. The authors 
model the Canadian unemployment insurance, which is more generous towards individuals 
living in regions with higher unemployment risk. Comparing this unconventional system to a 
“normal” insurance that treats all individuals in a country equally, the authors conclude that 
the existence of the current UI system can only be explained by the Canadian political 
process, as a majority of the voters would oppose it, whereas it is supported by a close 
majority in the parliament when the electoral process is taken into account. 
 
The rest of this paper is laid out as follows. In section 2, the basic model is presented and the 
numerical solution strategy is explained. Section 3 described the calibration of the model and 
presents the optimal unemployment systems under various assumptions. Then the results of a 
vote on these optimal systems are discussed. Finally, the effects of considering the transitional - 4 - 
dynamics after the switch to an alternative UI scheme are presented. The last sections 
concludes. 
2. The Model 
2.1.  The Basic Set-up 
Consider an economy that is populated by a large constant number of finitely lived 
heterogeneous agents. Agents work for a certain number of periods and are retired thereafter. 
During their working life, they can either be unemployed or hold a job. When the first come 
into existence, all agents are identical. During their lives, however, they are exposed to 
idiosyncratic shocks, leading to increasing heterogeneity in asset holding, individual 
productivity, wages, and claims to social insurance. 
Jobs are offered by firms that produce for a competitive product market. The labour market is 
modelled using a version of Pissarides’s (2000) two-sided search approach.
1 Thus, the number 
of jobs offered and the probability of creating a match between an unemployed worker and a 
vacant job are determined by a matching function and a zero-profits constraint for firms. 
There is also a government that can provide unemployment insurance or other benefits that 
are paid for by taxes. 
2.2.  The Household Sector 
There large number of agents – or households – who live for L periods. The population is 
stationary, meaning that each period as many agents newly enter the economy as there are 
deaths, i.e. a share of 1 L  of the total population is replaced each period. 
Agents can be either employed or unemployed during the first Lr-1 periods of their lives, and 
are retired thereafter. In each period j0 of their lives, they maximise their expected lifetime 
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1 ibid., chapter 1. - 5 - 
subject to a budget constraint that must hold with probability one. Here, u is the period utility 
function with the usual properties, cj the consumption in period j, and β is the discount factor.
2 
0 E j is the mathematical expectation operator conditional on all information available in period 


















Let aj be the assets owned at the beginning of period j and yj the net income (including all 
kinds of benefits, but excluding interest income) received in the same period, then the period 
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if the household leaves no bequest. Here, r is the risk-free interest rate, R=1+r. The budget 
constraint is required to hold for each individual. 
 
Agents are characterised by a variable individual skill component. These skills qj depend on 
the employment history of the agent: during unemployment, they deteriorate by a factor 1-δu 
per period, and while employed, a worker enjoys a skill increase by the factor 1+δe. 
Immediately after being fired, qj declines by 1-δf. 
The “labour productivity” of an agent on a job is 
 
 () jj j p mq q χ = + , (4) 
 
which is a function of the job-specific “match quality” mj and the current individual skill 
level, consisting of a variable component qj and a fixed personal component q. χ is a scaling 
parameter. 
                                                 
2 For better readability, I leave out the index i for the agent, i.e. I write cj instead if ci,j for the consumption of 
individual i in period j. - 6 - 
Agents start their lives as without a job. Unemployed workers receive job offers at a Poisson 
rate  ω, which is determined by the tightness of the labour market. So each period, after 
making their consumption decision,  these agents may be presented with zero, one, or several 
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Agents consider the best offer and decide whether to accept or to reject this job. 
The wage to be earned on a job is negotiated between the jobseeker and the firm. I assume 
Nash bargaining over the wage w upon job creation. 
 
 
1 argmax ( ) ( )
r
jw j j ww w p w
ε ε − =− −   (6) 
  
r
j w  is the household’s reservation wage, and  j p   is the agent’s marginal productivity on the 
job. The parameter ε stands for the bargaining strength of the household. 
As mentioned, the productivity of an agent improves while he is employed. I assume here that 
while an agent holds a job, the wage increases at the same rate. This means that in the wage 
negotiations the ex-ante surplus of a job is split between employer and employee according to 
their relative bargaining strengths. 
Employees never quit, but face the risk of being laid off with probability λ per period. 
A household’s period net income yj is simply the sum of net wage income and benefits. In 
general, it may be a function of an agent’s entire current situation and history. A central 
assumption underlying the model is that any risk stemming from employment and income 
uncertainty must be borne by the individual, i.e. there is no way of insuring against 
fluctuations of  j y  except saving. After retirement, income ceases to be random in any respect, 
thus for agents aged  r L  or above, the individual consumption choice problem is deterministic. 
 
A recursive formulation of the agents’ decision problem making use of Bellman’s approach 
can be written as 
 
1
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j
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with  1 0 L v + = ,where the maximisation is subject to the budget constraint 
 
  1 () jj j j aR a y c + =+ − ,  1 0 L a + = . (BC) 
 
The value function  (.) j v  represents the highest discounted lifetime value an agent of age  j  
can achieve in the situation characterised by the function’s parameters.  { , , } j se u r ∈  stands for 
the current employment status (employed, unemployed, retired) and  j Ω  is meant to capture 
all relevant information about the individual employment history required to compute the net 
income  j y .  m  is the minimum match quality required to make a job acceptable to an 
unemployed agent. 
 
Under standard regularity conditions the agent’s decision problem is well-defined and has the 
usual properties: The optimal savings choice requires smoothing the marginal utility of 
consumption over time according to the Euler equation 
 
  11 () [ ( ) ] jj jj j uc REu c β ++ ′′ = . (8) 
 
Depending on the parameters R  and β , some agents may behave like buffer-stock savers 
(see Deaton 1991 and Carroll 1997). In a world of perfect foresight they would choose a 
consumption level above their current resources, borrow money and repay it later in their 
lives. But with income uncertainty and the requirement to repay any debt with probability 
one, the agents’ ability to borrow is practically limited. Consequently, they choose a certain 
target-amount of savings (the buffer-stock), that is an optimal compromise between the 
unachievable long-run consumption profile and the necessity to self-insure against unforeseen 
income fluctuations. However, agents approaching the retirement age  r L  are likely to 
accumulate assets in order to provide for the final periods of their lifetime, when they cannot 
earn labour income any more. 
The optimal job-acceptance rule implies a match threshold m  that depends on the current 
individual situation. If the best job offered to an unemployed agent in a certain period exhibits 
a match quality above m , it is accepted, otherwise the agent chooses to remain unemployed. 
Ceteris paribus, a faster skill decline  u δ  during unemployment or a higher value of a given 
job (higher  e δ  or lower λ ) imply a lower value of m . - 8 - 
2.3. Firms 
Firms produce goods according to a Cobb-Douglas production function 
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using the inputs capital K and labour N. Firms are price-takers at the capital market, where 
they rent assets at the interest rate r. Capital depreciates at the rate δ. It follows from the 
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Firms negotiate wages with workers as discussed in the previous subsection. the resulting 
wage must lie between the reservation wage of the worker and the marginal productivity of 
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Thus, firms earn a rent on each job, the size of which depends on the productivity of the job 
and the worker’s outside option at the time when the job was created. As jobs are destroyed at 
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where J is the number of periods left until the agent retires. 
To find employees in the first place, firms must engage in costly search. This is done by 
creating a vacancy at the cost k per period. Following Pissarides (2000), I assume that free 
market entry drives profits down to zero, meaning that in equilibrium the number of vacancies 
is such that total vacancy costs are equal to total expected rents. - 9 - 
2.4.  Markets and Government 
There is an imperfect labour market in the economy. Both households searching for a job and 
firms that want to hire must wait until they are matched. The total number of worker-firm 
matches per period is determined by a matching function M 
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that is increasing in its arguments U (the number of unemployed workers) and V (the number 
of job offers). The probability of being matched is the same for all unemployed agents and all 
vacancies. The job arrival rate for a single unemployed individual is thus 
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θ=V/U is called the market tightness (see Pissarides 2000). If an agent receives more than one 
offer in one period, he is assumed to consider only the best one. A match need not lead to the 
creation of a job, however, as the match specific productivity component m of an agent on this 
job may be so low that the resulting wage is below the agent’s outside option. 
 
Both firms and households have access to a competitive capital market. In the baseline case of 
a closed economy, the interest rate r must balance domestic capital supply, i.e. net household 
asset supply, and the capital demand of the production sector. As discussed in Aiyagari (1994) 
and Huggett (1993), the equilibrium interest rate is likely to lie below the agents’ discount 
rate 1-β, because households are exposed to uninsurable income risk. Households thus whish 
to hold more wealth to improve consumption smoothing in the case of undesirable income 
realisations. 
In the case of a small open economy, the interest rate is equal to a “world” interest rate r*. 
Any difference between the net asset supply of the household sector and the capital demand of 
the firms is invested at or borrowed from the world capital market. 
 
There is also a government that raises taxes to provide social insurance. I consider two 
different concepts of unemployment insurance, one with fixed benefits and the other with 
fixed replacement rates. There may be up to three different benefit levels b1 to b3 or 
replacement ratios ρ1 to ρ3, one for the first six months of unemployment, one for the next six - 10 - 
months, and one for the time thereafter. This should be flexible enough to capture the main 
features of existing benefit systems and also allow for a meaningful interpretation of the 
(constrained) optimal benefit scheme in terms of a benefit profile over time. 
The government finances its expenditures by a proportional tax t on wages and benefits. 
2.5. Long-run  Equilibrium 
Definition 1: steady-state equilibrium 
The economy just described is defined to be in a steady-state rational expectations equilibrium 
if 
1.  households maximise their utility 
2.  firms maximise their profits 
3.  the capital market clears at the interest rate r 
4.  firms make zero profits on average given the tightness θ of the labour market 
5.  the government budget is balanced 
6.  r, θ, and the government policy are expected to remain unchanged 
7.  the cross-sectional distribution of the population with respect to the state variables is 
constant. 
2.6.  The Welfare Measure 
In the next section, various policy regimes are compared with respect to the welfare they 
provide in equilibrium. The welfare measure used to this end is the expected lifetime utility of 
a newly born agent. As all agents are identical at the beginning of their lifecycle, this measure 
is representative. The resulting welfare criterion provides a ranking of policies that is 
independent of any reference population. 
Whenever two levels of welfare W1 and W2 corresponding to two different policies are 
compared, a kind of “compensating variation” measure R is employed: R(W1,W2) is the 
proportional consumption increase under policy 1 that makes the agent indifferent between 
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2.7.  The Solution Algorithm 
The algorithm used to numerically solve for the three parameters that characterise 
equilibrium, namely r, θ, and the tax rate t (given certain benefit levels), is similar to that used 
by Costain (1999) and Heer (2003) among others. It can be stated as follows: 
 
Algorithm 1 
1  guess initial parameters r0, θ0, and t0 
2 repeat  for  n=0,1,...  
2.1  derive optimal household behaviour, taking rn, θn, and tn as given 
2.2  simulate a large number I of individual histories and compute aggregate asset 
supply and demand, aggregate profits, the government budget balance, and 
welfare Wn 
2.3  update parameters to get rn+1, θn+1, and tn+1 
3 until  convergence 
 
In step 2.3, the new parameters are chosen as follows. First, a “ceteris paribus guess” of 
parameter value is computed that would be compatible with equilibrium if household 
behaviour did not change. The next round parameter is then a convex combination of the 
current parameter and the ceteris paribus equilibrium guess. 
Convergence is reached if all of the following conditions are met: 
1.  the newly guessed parameters are close to the current parameters: 
11 1 || ( ) nn nn rr rrε ++ −+ < ,  11 1 || ( ) nn nn θ θθ θ ε ++ −+ < ,  11 1 || ( ) nn nn tt ttε ++ − +<  
2.  the difference between aggregate asset supply A
s
 and asset demand A
d, firm profit, and the 
government budget imbalance are small: 
2 || ( )
sd sd
nn nn AA AA ε −+ < ,  2 || ( ) nn nn ε Π− Κ Π+ Κ < ,  2 || ( ) nn nn BT BT ε − +< , 
where  Π is the aggregate quasi-rent earned by firms on existing jobs, Κ  is aggregate 
vacancy costs, B are total benefit payments and T is the government’s tax revenue. 
3.  the welfare change between Wn-1 and Wn is small:  13 (, ) nn RW W ε + <  
 - 12 - 
It should be mentioned that the algorithm just described does not necessarily converge for all 
policies. If, for example, benefit are so high that the unemployment rate becomes close to one, 
there is no way to avoid a budget deficit. For this reason, the algorithm is stopped if it has not 
converged within 30 loops, which lies sufficiently above the 8 to 12 loops that are usually 
required. 
3. Calibration and Experiments 
3.1.  Calibration of the Model 
The model is calibrated to resemble some properties of the West German economy in the 
1990ies. First of all, the period length is set at ½ month. This results in a lifetime of 1,440 
periods for all agents. While this number is rather large, the short period duration is likely to 
contribute to a more realistic simulated search behaviour than would be possible in a model at 
quarterly or annual frequency. 
 
Table 1: Calibrated parameters. 
value  parameter 
γ=1  γ=2  γ=3 
δe 
  growth rate of skills during employment
 a 0.016 
δu
  skill loss per period during unemployment
 a 0.12 
δf  skill decline at job loss  0.2 
λ
  job destruction rate
 a 0.045 
σm  standard deviation of log match quality  0.22 
α  capital share parameter  0.3 
δ
  capital depreciation rate
 a 0.076 
η  match function parameter  0.5 
ε  household bargaining strength  0.95 
χ
   scale parameter
 b 400 
β
  discount factor
 a 0.961  0.950  0.934 
k
  vacancy cost 
b 321  298  249 
a per annum 
b per period 
 - 13 - 
The choice of the labour market parameters δe,  δu,  δf, and λ  is motivated by the micro 
estimates obtained in Pollak (2005). The productivity improvement on the job δe is 1.6% per 
year. Job loss results in an immediate decrease of productivity of δf=20%, and during 
unemployment skills keep on declining at the rate δu=12% per annum. The job destruction 
rate of λ=4.5% per year implies an average duration of 22 years between two unemployment 
spells. The standard deviation of the log match quality of job offers is chosen to be σm=0.22. 
The production technology is characterised by a capital share parameter α=0.3 and a 
depreciation rate of δ=7.6% per annum. The matching function parameter η is chosen to be 
0.5. The relative bargaining strength of the household ε is set at 95%. While this value is 
much higher then the 50% often found in the literature, it seems to yield plausible results: for 
a market tightness of one and an unemployment rate of 4.3%, the cost of a vacancy is 
approximately 10% of the average gross wage. The scale χ is 400, which yields realistic DM 
wage levels. The parameter q is set to zero.  
 
To highlight the importance of the prevailing risk aversion for the optimal choice of an 
unemployment insurance system, the experiments conducted in the following section are 
performed for three different values of the parameter of relative risk aversion,  {1, 2, 3} γ ∈ , 
that will be referred to as the low, medium and high risk aversion case hereafter. For each of 
these values, a base calibration is chosen that makes the endogenous variables of the model 
close to values observed in reality. The unemployment insurance system used for all these 
calibrations is one with a constant replacement ratio of 67% during the first year of the 
unemployment spell and 57% thereafter. These were the legal replacement ratios for 
unemployed persons with at least one child in Germany in the years 1994 to 2004. 
There is an issue concerning the treatment of young agents who have never held a job in their 
life in the unemployment insurance system. In a system with defined replacement ratios their 
benefit level is not well-defined. But even when policies with defined benefit levels are 
considered, one might want to exclude agents who have not worked before. One reason for 
doing so is the fact that – as all agents are created without a job in this model – the welfare 
measure would be dominated by the effects of benefits paid to very young unemployed 
agents, if they were allowed to participate in the insurance system. To avoid this effect, in all 
simulations only those agents who have held a job before are eligible for unemployment 
compensation. 
Without an income in the first periods of their working life, agents need to bee equipped with 
a positive initial wealth a1 to be able to maintain a positive level of consumption throughout - 14 - 
their lives. This initial wealth should not be set too low, because otherwise welfare measure 
would be influenced very strongly by the chances of finding a first job very fast. In all 
simulations, agents are thus provided with initial assets of 14,583, corresponding to about 
three times a typical initial monthly wage. This initial wealth is given to new agents as a 
transfer paid out of the government budget. 
  
For all tree base calibrations, the discount factor β is chosen such that the real interest rate 
matches the 1990 to 1996 average of 3.3% per annum. The vacancy cost k is calibrated to 
result in a job offer rate ω of 9 per period. Without loss of generality, the market tightness θ is 
normalised to one in these base cases. The calibrated parameters are summarised in Table 1. 
 
In all numerical experiments, the number of simulated individual histories is 20,000, resulting 
in a total number of 28.8 million individual-age observations. The lifecycles are created using 
a pre-selected set of random numbers, which is necessary for the algorithm to converge. 
However, while the variance of the endogenous variables conditional on the chosen set of 
random numbers is only driven by the convergence criteria of the algorithm and can be made 
small, the varibales unavoidably exhibit an unconditional variance that is due to the limited 
number of simulated cases. Table 2 lists the unconditional standard deviations of the interest 
rate, the market tightness, the tax rate, and the welfare measure. The figures were obtained 
applying the solution algorithm several times to the same problem, but basing the simulations 
on different sets of random numbers.
3 The significance of differences between these 
parameters under different policies should be judged by these variances. 
The parameters that indicate when the iteration of the solution algorithm is to be stopped are 
35
12 3 10 , 5 10 εε ε
−− == = ⋅ . 
 
Some equilibrium statistics for the base calibrations are reported in Table 3. As explained 
above, the real interest rate and the market tightness are the same in the tree scenarios. The 
resulting unemployment rates lie between 3.8% and 5.2%, increasing with risk-aversion. The 
tax rates reflect the varying costs for unemployment benefits in the scenarios. Aggregate (per 
capita) output can be split in a labour share (1-α=70%), which consists of aggregate gross 
labour income and aggregate vacancy costs, and the capital share consisting of aggregate 
                                                 
3 Fore these simulations, tighter convergence criteria than for the other simulations were used. See notes to Table 
2. - 15 - 
capital income and the depreciation of the stock (not reported in the table). The share of the 
per-capita government budget that is used to pay the for the initial asset holding of newly 
created agents amounts to 243 per annum in all simulations. For convenience, the average 
gross monthly wage is also reported in the table. As both wages and unemployment benefits 
are taxed at the same rate, this figure can be compared to the benefit levels of the alternative 
unemployment insurance policies considered in the next subsection. 
 
Table 2: Measured unconditional standard deviations of the parameters. 
variable  r  θ  t W
a 
unconditional standard deviation  5.54·10
-7  0.024 6.48·10
-6 3.47·10
-4 
a s.d. of compensating variation 
convergence criterion: 
46
12 3 10 , 5 10 εε ε
−− == = ⋅  
 
Table 3: Equilibrium outcomes: base calibrations. 
values  variable 
γ=1  γ=2  γ=3 
r
  real interest rate
 a 0.033  0.033  0.033 
θ  labour market tightness  1  1  1 
t  wage tax rate  0.025  0.028  0.033 
u  unemployment rate  0.038  0.043  0.052 
aggregate output 
b  77,039 76,272 75,222 
aggregate net labour income 
b  52,362 51,672 50,692 
aggregate capital income 
b  6,723 6,656 6,564 
government budget 
b  1,343 1,489 1,730 
aggregate vacancy costs 
b  222 229 233 
average monthly gross wage  6,206  6,170  6,145 
a per annum 
b per annum, per capita of total population 
3.2.  Optimal Benefit Levels 
In this subsection, the welfare maximising defined replacement ratio and defined benefit 
unemployment insurance policies are presented. They are computed using a simple two-stage 
grid search strategy. The values considered for the monthly unemployment benefits b1, b2, and - 16 - 
b3 cover the range between zero and 6,000 with a step length of 400. For the replacement 
ratios ρ1 to ρ3, 13 values from 0 to 1.2 were taken into account.
4 
The optimal benefit levels and replacement ratios are presented in Table 4 and Table 5, 
together with some equilibrium statistics on these policies. It may be surprising that, 
regardless of the level of risk aversion assumed, no payments are made to agents whose 
unemployment spell lasts for less than one year. Even though the moral hazard effect of 
moderate benefits for short-term unemployed agents would not be too high, this form of 
“consumption insurance” would lead to welfare losses. Agents can efficiently provide for 
short periods of unemployment themselves by saving, thereby creating a positive external 
effect on the capital stock and thus output. 
The optimal benefit for long-tem unemployed workers, however, may be positive if the 
degree of risk aversion assumed is high. While b1 is zero if the rate of relative risk aversion is 
one, it increases to 400 and even 2,000 per month if γ equals 2 or 3, respectively. The optimal 
long-run replacement ratios show a similar pattern: in the low risk aversion case, the 
replacement ratio should be zero. For the higher risk aversion cases, ρ3 is 0.3 and 0.4. 
Under the optimal policies, the real interest rates are below the base calibration level. This can 
be explained by the increased amount of precautionary saving that becomes necessary as the 
short-run unemployment benefits are abolished. The aggregate capital income even increases 
in the low risk aversion case, but it declines for γ≥2. Also, the unemployment rates are much 
lower than in the base case. In addition to the direct effect that the higher employment has on 
total output, there is an indirect effect. Less unemployment also means less skill depreciation 
and therefore a higher average productivity of employees on the job. This productivity 
increase amounts to about 0.8% for γ=1 and 0.1% in the γ=3 case. There are two further 
effects that tend to increase the average gross wages under the optimal regimes. First, the 
lower real interest rate leads to a higher capital usage per productive worker. Second, the 
                                                 
4 The grid search computation of the optimal benefit levels was performed as follows. In a first step, the best 
combination of benefits 
3
123 ( , , ) {0,1000,2000,...,6000} bbb ∈  was determined. Then, in the second step, the six 
or seven multiples of 400 closest to this best combination along each dimensions were searched. 
The search for the optimal replacement ratio was done in a similar fashion starting out with the grid 
3 {0,0.2,0.4,...,1}  in the first step and then considering the values 
** *
11 1 { 0.2, 0.1,..., 0.2} ρρ ρ − −+ ×  
** *
22 2 { 0.2, 0.1,..., 0.2} ρρ ρ −− + ×
** *
33 3 { 0.2, 0.1,..., 0.2} ρρ ρ −− +  around the first step optimum 
***
123 ( ,,) ρ ρρ in 
step two. 
No negative benefits or replacement ratios were taken into account. - 17 - 
higher market tightness allows unemployed agents to choose from a greater number of job 
offers, which improves the average worker-firm match by about 0.04% (γ=2) to 2.7% (γ=3). 
Despite the fact that the lower benefits under the optimal system tend to worsen the workers’ 
bargaining position, employees still strongly benefit from the improved average match 
quality. 
 
Table 4: Equilibrium outcomes: optimal defined benefit. 
values  variable 
γ=1  γ=2  γ=3 
b1  monthly benefit:  months 1-6  0  0  0 
b2   months  7-12  0  0  0 
b3   months  13-  0  400  2,000 
r
  real interest rate
 a 0.031  0.029  0.028 
θ  labour market tightness  2.93  3.94  4.93 
t  wage tax rate  0.004  0.004  0.005 
u  unemployment rate  0.014  0.011  0.011 
aggregate output 
b  81,519 82,264 82,859 
aggregate net labour income 
b  56,587 57,099 57,491 
aggregate capital income 
b  6,808 6,609 6,423 
government budget 
b  243 243 261 
aggregate vacancy costs 
b  233 243 250 
average monthly gross wage  6,402  6,445  6,490 
welfare improvement 
c  0.049 0.062 0.083 
a per annum 
b per annum, per capita of total population 
c compared to base calibration 
 
Comparing the optimal benefit scenarios to the base case, the welfare differences are 
substantial. They range from an improvement worth a consumption increase of 4.9% in the 
low risk aversion case up to 8.3% in the high risk aversion scenario. With optimal benefits 
and replacement ratios of zero, the optimal defined benefit and defined replacement ratio 
policies are equal in the γ=1 case. For higher risk aversions, the defined benefit policies yield 
higher welfare levels than the replacement ratio systems. - 18 - 
One should note that the choice of the short-run benefits b1 and b2 has a much smaller impact 
on welfare than the long-term benefit b3. Figure 1 shows the welfare effects of varying each 
benefit parameter while the other two parameters remain at their optimal level. A badly 
chosen b3 in the range between 0 and 2,500 may reduce welfare by more than 20%, whereas 
varying b1 and b2 in the same range affects welfare by less than 1%. 
 
Table 5: Equilibrium outcomes: optimal replacement ratios. 
values  variable 
γ=1  γ=2  γ=3 
ρ1  replacement ratio:  months 1-6  0  0  0 
ρ2   months  7-12  0  0  0 
ρ3   months  13-  0  0.3  0.4 
r
  real interest rate
 a 0.031  0.030  0.026 
θ  labour market tightness  2.93  3.88  5.70 
t  wage tax rate  0.004  0.004  0.004 
u  unemployment rate  0.014  0.012  0.010 
aggregate output 
b  81,519 82,181 83,646 
aggregate net labour income 
b  56,587 57,039 58,052 
aggregate capital income 
b  6,808 6,628 6,226 
government budget 
b  243 244 248 
aggregate vacancy costs 
b  233 243 252 
average monthly gross wage  6,402  6,440  6,543 
welfare improvement 
c  0.049 0.061 0.074 
a per annum 
b per annum, per capita of total population 
c compared to base calibration 
 
In the light of these results one may conclude that the efficiency of the German 
unemployment insurance system could be significantly improved by replacing the high 
replacement ratio for long-term unemployed workers by a defined benefit of an appropriate 
amount. Indeed, that is exactly the kind of reform the government has recently adopted. 
Starting in January 2005, the former unemployment assistance available to workers who run - 19 - 
out of the usual unemployment insurance after six to twelve months
5 is replaced by a benefit 
at social assistance level. The resulting benefit for long-term unemployed persons lies 
somewhere close to the optimal benefits computed for the γ=2 and the γ=3 case, depending on 
the household size and situation. However, an important difference between the 
unemployment systems considered in the simulations and existing benefits is that the latter are 
often means-tested. 
 





















































To require – as has been done above – that every cent of additional domestic saving is 
invested in the home country is a strong assumption.  In what follows, the opposite extreme 
case of a small, fully open economy is considered. Starting from the same base cases as 
before, the welfare maximising unemployment benefit profiles are obtained under the 
assumption that the interest rate remains unchanged. There is a world market supplying 
capital elastically at the prevailing interest rate. 
 
                                                 
5 Older persons may still receive the high unemployment insurance benefit for a longer period, up to 32 months 
in 2004 and up to 18 months if they become unemployed after February 2005. - 20 - 
Table 6: Equilibrium outcomes: optimal defined benefit (open economy). 
values  variable 
γ=1  γ=2  γ=3 
b1  monthly benefit:  months 1-6  0  400  6,000 
b2   months  7-12  0  0  400 
b3   months  13-  800  1,600  2,000 
r
  real interest rate
 a 0.033  0.033  0.033 
θ  labour market tightness  2.84  3.45  3.35 
t  wage tax rate  0.004  0.005  0.015 
u  unemployment rate  0.014  0.013  0.016 
aggregate output 
b  80,857 80,870 80,462 
aggregate net labour income 
b  56,125 56,289 55,246 
aggregate capital income 
b  7,297 7,057 6,916 
government budget 
b  244 282 837 
aggregate vacancy costs 
b  231 238 240 
average monthly gross wage  6,353  6,367  6,333 
welfare improvement 
c  0.046 0.057 0.078 
a per annum 
b per annum, per capita of total population 
c compared to base calibration 
 
Table 6 and Table 7 summarise the equilibrium outcomes under the optimal policies for the 
open economy. Without the positive effect of additional savings on domestic capital and thus 
productivity, the optimal benefit levels and replacement ratios are higher than in the closed 
economy scenario. While the optimal benefit for long term unemployed is now higher in the 
γ=1 and γ=2 cases, it still does not exceed the value of b3=2,000 and ρ3=0.4. The optimal 
benefit paid during the first six months of a spell is now as high as 6,000 in the high risk 
aversion case, which is approximately the level of the average wage.
6 Interestingly, this stark 
increase of generosity compared to the optimal closed economy benefits comes at only a 
rather small cost in terms of unemployment. The unemployment rate in the low risk aversion 
case is the same as above, for higher risk aversion it changes by no more than ½ percentage 
point. 
                                                 
6 as 6,000 is the highest benefit level considered in the simulations, even higher values for b1 might lead to 
further welfare improvements. - 21 - 
Aggregate output and wages are somewhat lower than in the closed economy simulations. 
This is mainly explained by the lower capital intensity caused by the unchanged interest rate. 
The average individual productivity and match quality are almost the same as for the optimal 
policies in the closed economy. Capital income is now higher than in both the base calibration 
and the closed economy cases. The high risk aversion optimal defined benefit scenario with 
its very high benefit for the first six months of the unemployment spell is the only case where 
domestic capital supply falls short of demand. The net foreign position amounts to 1.5% of 
the total capital stock in this case. In the other cases, between 3.7% (defined benefit, γ=1) and 
8.3% (defined replacement ratio, γ=2) of the domestic savings are invested abroad. 
Like in the closed economy case, the optimal fixed benefit regimes generate a higher welfare 
than the systems based on defined replacement ratios. Moreover, the simulations show that 
the switch to an optimal system yields higher welfare improvements in a closed economy. 
 
Table 7: Equilibrium outcomes: optimal replacement ratios (open economy). 
values  variable 
γ=1  γ=2  γ=3 
ρ1  replacement ratio:  months 1-6  0  0  0.4 
ρ2   months  7-12  0  0  0.1 
ρ3   months  13-  0.3  0.4  0.4 
r
  real interest rate
 a 0.033  0.033  0.033 
θ  labour market tightness  2.83  3.71  4.78 
t  wage tax rate  0.004  0.004  0.008 
u  unemployment rate  0.014  0.012  0.011 
aggregate output 
b  80,849 81,053 81,323 
aggregate net labour income 
b  56,119 56,254 56,243 
aggregate capital income 
b  7,331 7,642 7,588 
government budget 
b  245 245 439 
aggregate vacancy costs 
b  231 239 244 
average monthly gross wage  6,352  6,354  6,371 
welfare improvement 
c  0.046 0.054 0.062 
a per annum 
b per annum, per capita of total population 
c compared to base calibration - 22 - 
3.3.  No Depreciation of Skills 
It is a central assumption of the analysis performed so far that agents who lose their jobs 
suffer a permanent decrease of their productivity. This implies that unemployment does not 
only cause a transitory income reduction, but a permanent negative income shock. The risk of 
permanent income reductions of course is a much bigger threat to risk-averse agents than a 
temporary income drop. 
This subsection addresses the question how important such permanent income shocks are for 
the design of an unemployment insurance system. The evolution of the agents’ individual 
productivity is changed to no more depend on the employment history, but rather follow a 
deterministic path. Regardless of an agent’s current employment status, his productivity 
increases at a rate of δe= δu=0.67% per annum. There is no skill decline at job loss. The 
productivity increase is chosen to approximately match the expected productivity 
improvements used before. Without a permanent shock to productivity, only two transitory 
income shocks remain: Firstly, during unemployment, wage income is replaced by benefits, 
and secondly the acceptance of a new job is associated with a new random worker-firm match 
quality. While this latter shock is transitory in the sense that it does not affect wage income 
prospects beyond the duration of the current job, average employment durations are so long 
that this match quality shock may have an important impact on lifetime earnings. 
Table 8 lists the variables that are calibrated differently than for the above simulations, and 
Table 9 presents the base calibrations for the case without skill depreciation.  
 
Table 8: Calibrated parameters (no depreciation case). 
value  parameter 
γ=1  γ=2  γ=3 
δe 
  growth rate of skills during employment
 a 0.0067 
δu
  skill loss per period during unemployment
 a -0.0067 
δf  skill decline at job loss  0 
β
  discount factor
 a 0.965  0.962  0.958 
k
  vacancy cost 
b 235  262  277 
a per annum 
b per period 
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Table 9: Equilibrium outcomes: base calibrations (no depreciation case). 
values  variable 
γ=1  γ=2  γ=3 
r
  real interest rate
 a 0.033  0.033  0.033 
θ  labour market tightness  1  1  1 
t  wage tax rate  0.032  0.031  0.031 
u  unemployment rate  0.052  0.048  0.046 
aggregate output 
b  85,645 84,453 83,766 
aggregate net labour income 
b  57,820 57,036 56,592 
aggregate capital income 
b  7,474 7,370 7,310 
government budget 
b  1,912 1,854 1,813 
aggregate vacancy costs 
b  220 227 231 
average monthly gross wage  7,000  6,874  6,804 
a per annum 
b per annum, per capita of total population 
 
The equilibrium outcomes for the optimal defined benefit and replacement ratio cases are 
reproduced in Table 10 and Table 11, respectively. The optimal benefit levels are zero both 
for the first six months of an unemployment spell and for unemployment durations beyond 
one year. Only during months seven to twelve of a spell, low benefits are paid. The optimal 
replacement ratios are zero throughout with the exception of a 10% replacement rate for long-
term unemployed in the high risk aversion (γ=3) case. 
The potential for output and wage increases by implementing a better unemployment 
insurance system is smaller than in the cases with skill depreciation discussed above. This can 
simply be explained by the fact that a decrease of the equilibrium unemployment rate does not 
lead to an improvement of the average productivity here. However, there is still scope for 
considerable welfare improvements between 3% and 4.4%. 
The equilibrium unemployment rates under the optimal policies are higher than in the case 
with productivity declines, which is simply the effect of longer job search, as the cost of 
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Table 10: Equilibrium outcomes: optimal defined benefit (no depreciation case). 
values  variable 
γ=1  γ=2  γ=3 
b1  monthly benefit:  months 1-6  0  0  0 
b2   months 7-12  0  400  800 
b3   months 13-  0  0  0 
r
  real interest rate
 a 0.028  0.024  0.020 
θ  labour market tightness  2.10  2.41  2.58 
t  wage tax rate  0.004  0.004  0.004 
u  unemployment rate  0.026  0.022  0.020 
aggregate output 
b  88,571 88,823 89,443 
aggregate net labour income 
b  61,524 61,569 62,093 
aggregate capital income 
b  6,819 6,051 5,323 
government budget 
b  243 254 263 
aggregate vacancy costs 
b  232 245 254 
average monthly gross wage  7,047  7,033  7,067 
welfare improvement 
c  0.030 0.038 0.044 
a per annum 
b per annum, per capita of total population 
c compared to base calibration 
 
Compared to the cases with permanent productivity reductions discussed above, in this 
economy with reduced income risk, the potential welfare increases due to the introduction of 
an unemployment insurance system are very small. In the high risk aversion case (γ=3), where 
the benefits from any form of consumption insurance are most important, the welfare 
improvement from implementing the optimal benefit levels rather than no unemployment 
insurance at all amounts to 0.03%.  In the scenario with skill depreciation, the optimal benefit 
equilibrium yields a welfare 1.8% above the no-insurance level. - 25 - 
Table 11: Equilibrium outcomes: optimal replacement ratios (no depreciation case). 
values  variable 
γ=1  γ=2  γ=3 
ρ1  replacement ratio:  months 1-6  0  0  0 
ρ2   months  7-12  0  0  0 
ρ3   months  13-  0  0  0.1 
r
  real interest rate
 a 0.028  0.023  0.023 
θ  labour market tightness  2.10  2.44  2.37 
t  wage tax rate  0.004  0.004  0.004 
u  unemployment rate  0.026  0.021  0.021 
aggregate output 
b  88,571 88,823 88,428 
aggregate net labour income 
b  61,524 61,688 61,400 
aggregate capital income 
b  6,819 6,033 5,948 
government budget 
b  243 243 250 
aggregate vacancy costs 
b  232 245 250 
average monthly gross wage  7,047  7,031  6,997 
welfare improvement 
c  0.030 0.038 0.044 
a per annum 
b per annum, per capita of total population 
c compared to base calibration 
3.4. Voting 
So far, optimal unemployment insurance policies were derived under different assumptions 
concerning the risk aversion of workers and the openness of the economy. The welfare 
criterion used was the expected life-cycle utility of a newly born agent. While this welfare 
criterion is appealing from a theoretical point of view, it is not informative about the chances 
of a policy to be put in place in an economy with democratic voting mechanisms.  
This sub-section addresses the question whether a switch from the status quo unemployment 
insurance system to the optimal policy would be approved by a majority of the voters. The 
status quo is the base calibration with the high replacement ratios of 67% during the first year 
of the unemployment spell and 57% thereafter. The voting mechanism is the same as the 
“helicopter drop” voting equilibrium defined in Pallage and Zimmermann (2004). The 
equilibrium population under the status quo policy is asked whether they enjoy a higher 
expected lifetime value under the current system or the long-run equilibrium corresponding - 26 - 
alternative policy, given their current state (i.e. age, employment situation, assets, etc.). 
Indifferent agents are assumed to vote for the alternative policy. Pallage and Zimmermann 
relate this voting mechanism to the following policy experiment: All agents living under the 
status quo regime are dropped at the border between two (big) countries, one of which 
implements the status-quo policy, the other the alternative system, and are allowed to choose 
in which country to live. An alternative interpretation would be that all members of the status-
quo population are to vote on the immediate switch to the new policy, assuming that all macro 
variables would jump to their new long-run equilibrium values right after the possible policy 
change. 
Table 12 presents the shares of votes in favour of the optimal policy for the scenarios 
discussed in section 3.2. In the closed economy setting, where the interest rate adjusts to 
balance the domestic capital market, just over fifty percent of the agents vote for the optimal 
policy, regardless of the level of risk aversion assumed. The best defined replacement ratio 
system, which yields slightly lower welfare than the defined benefit system for γ=2,3, gets a 
similar share of the votes as the optimal system for γ=2, but is not accepted in the high risk 
aversion case. In the open economy case, all optimal policies are accepted by a large majority 
of above 95% of all voters. 
 
Table 12: Approval for policy switch to optimal unemployment system. 
approval for optimal policy  case 
γ=1  γ=2  γ=3 
opt. def. benefit  51.1%  53.5%  50.8% 
opt. def. repl. ratio  51.1%  54.6%  41.8% 
opt. def. benefit (open econ.)  97.8%  97.7%  97.4% 
opt. def. repl. ratio (open econ.)  97.7%  97.1%  96.5% 
 
How can this voting behaviour be related to different demographic groups? First of all, retired 
agents must rely on their savings as the only source of consumption. This group is 
unambiguously worse off under a policy that leads to a lower interest rate than in the base 
case.
7 These agents account for 25 percentage points of the votes for the status quo. 
                                                 
7 The only exception are agent who are already in last period of their lives and consume all their assets in the 
current period. This group is indifferent. - 27 - 
Figure 2 depicts the approval for the optimal defined benefit policy for employed and 
unemployed agents by age for the closed economy case. As one would expect, the alternative, 
which is less generous than the status quo system, is more popular among employed agents. 
Neither is it surprising that approval for the alternative system drops sharply around age 60. 
Agents getting close to their retirement age have accumulated a substantial amount of assets. 
Under the alternative policy with the lower interest rate, they would forego considerable 
capital income. 
Among the age group between about 25 and 35 years, the support for the alternative policy is 
relatively low. Young agents who are unemployed or hold a relatively low paid job borrow 
against future income, which, under the status quo system, can never be below 57% of their 
current or last labour income, to improve their current consumption level. Such individuals 
would have problems repaying their debt in some states of the world if the alternative system 
with significantly lower benefits was introduced. Therefore, this group of agents opposes a 
regime switch. 
The high approval rates for the optimal policy in the case of the open economy are now easily 
explained. As the interest rate remains constant, retired agents are now indifferent between the 
status quo and the alternative system. As mentioned above, they are counted as votes for the 
alternative. Also, wealthy agents do not suffer capital income losses under the alternative and 
will therefore vote for the system with the higher labour market performance and lower taxes. 
Finally the group of young agents whose wealth would be too low under the optimal policy is 
very small in the open economy case, because here the optimal unemployment insurance 
system involves more generous benefits. 
Having looked at the numerical examples, some general statements about the chances of 
getting a majority for a welfare enhancing unemployment insurance reform of the type 
presented can be made. First of all, the chances for such a reform are higher in a small open 
economy, where the effect on the equilibrium interest rate is small. Second, if there is a 
negative effect on the interest rate, approval for the reform is higher if the share of retired 
people in the total population is lower
8 and if retirement income is less sensitive to the interest 
rate, e.g. in the presence of a pay-as-you-go pension system. Finally, the approval for the 
reform among young individuals with low or even negative wealth could be improved by 
                                                 
8 The computations were of course made for a stationary population with a given retirement age. Assuming 
however that the basic results would be similar for a slowly changing population and different retirement ages, a 
higher retirement age and faster population growth would seem to make the acceptance of the reform more 
likely.  - 28 - 
either introducing the reform with a delay, thereby giving everyone the chance to prepare for 
the new situation, or by paying higher benefits to short-term unemployed agents, at least as 
transitional measure. 
 








































































































3.5.  Transition to the new Equilibrium 
In the previous subsection, the approval for the optimal unemployment insurance system was 
analysed assuming that voters can choose between the steady states associated with the 
different policies. Clearly, this is not a very realistic assumption. In what follows, the 
transition to the new steady state equilibrium after the introduction of the optimal policy is 
studied. Starting from the base cases described in section 3.1, the transition to the new steady 
state under the optimal defined benefit system is examined for the three levels of risk aversion  
γ=1,2,3. To allow for time varying parameters and a changing composition of the population, 
a different equilibrium concept than the one used above is required. 
 - 29 - 
Definition 2: transitional equilibrium 
The economy is defined to be in a transitional rational expectations equilibrium with initial 
population P if 
1.  households maximise their utility in all periods τ=0,1,... 
2.  firms maximise their profits 
3.  the capital market clears every period at the interest rate rτ 
4.  firms make zero profits on average every period given the tightness θτ of the labour 
market 
5.  the government budget is balanced for all τ 
6.  rτ, θτ, and the government policy are anticipated correctly by the households 
7.  the initial cross-sectional distribution of the population with respect to the state 
variables is P. 
 
Finding the steady-state equilibrium simply amounts to finding the equilibrium cross-
sectional distribution of the population and three parameters, r,  θ, and the tax rate t. A 
transitional equilibrium may involve a different population distribution, interest rate, market 
tightness and tax rate every period. Finding such an equilibrium is not a trivial task: it is 
impossible to solve the problem forward in time because the future values of r, θ, and t are not 
yet known. Solving backwards starting from a cut-off period far enough in the future is 
neither possible, as the composition of the population in any period is history-dependent. 
The solution strategy I use circumvents this problem by attempting to solve for all periods’ 
parameters simultaneously in an iterative process similar to the algorithm described in section 
2.7. First, the problem is truncated at some period T. For all τ>T, the parameters rτ, θτ, and tτ 
are assumed to remain at their steady-state equilibrium levels r , θ , and t . The algorithm 
then proceeds as follows: 
 
Algorithm 2 
1  guess initial parameters 
0 rr τ = , 
0
τ θ θ = , and 
0 tt τ =  for  0...T τ =  
2 repeat  for  n=0,1,... 
2.1  derive optimal household behaviour for each cohort alive between periods 0 
and T, taking 
n r τ , 
n
τ θ , and 
n tτ  as given - 30 - 
2.2  simulate a large number I of individual histories for the periods  0...T τ =  
starting with an initial population corresponding to P, and compute aggregate 
asset supply and demand, aggregate profits, and the government budget 
balance for each period 
2.3  update parameters for every period using the same mechanism as in 
Algorithm 1 to get 




+ , and 
1 n tτ
+  
3 until  n=N 
 
I further made the assumption that the relevant parameters rτ, θτ, and tτ only change once a 
year instead of every period (i.e. 24 times a year). While not reducing the computational 
complexity of the problem, this simplification should improve the numerical properties of the 
algorithm for two reasons. First, with a smaller number of parameters to solve for, 
convergence is likely to be faster. Second, as the number of observed households per 
parameter is much larger, the variance in the market variables that govern the choice of the 
parameters (such as capital supply or the unemployment rate)  is smaller. 
The cut-off period chosen is T=1,440, meaning that a transition period corresponding to an 
agent’s lifetime is allowed for. While it is not certain that all adjustments are completed (up to 
an interesting level of accuracy) within this time, a horizon of 60 years seems long enough to 
evaluate a labour market reform. For each of the 1,440 cohorts of the initial population, 
20,000 agents are tracked over the time of 60 years, starting with the initial population 
corresponding to the base calibration
9. Where necessary, cohorts are replaced by a new 
generation at the end of their lifetime. This results in a total of 20,000x1,440x1,440=4.1⋅10
10 
agent-period observation or 691 million observations per year. The algorithm is iterated ten 
times. The resulting parameters meet the first convergence criterion defined in section 2.7 for 
all but a few periods, where they are only slightly beyond the value of  1 ε  used in the 
simulations above. Convergence is usually better for later periods. 
Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of the parameters rτ, θτ, and tτ as well as the unemployment 
rate over the simulated 60 year transition period for the three degrees of risk aversion γ=1,2,3. 
                                                 
9 Using the base calibration population that exists under a much more generous benefit system than the regime 
actually used in the computation of the transition period creates the problem that some agents may be in a 
situation that yields an expected lifetime utility of -∞. This can happen if their current wealth is so low that they 
cannot be certain to have a positive consumption under all circumstances. In such cases, the agents’ consumption 
and reservation wage are set to zero until they return to a finite expected lifetime utility. - 31 - 
In the case of low risk aversion, where the benefits are set to zero, the tax rate reaches its long 
run equilibrium level almost immediately. What is more surprising is that the labour market 
tightness and the unemployment rate also jump to their new equilibrium level after only one 
year. Only the interest rate takes several years to adjust. In the other two cases γ=2,3, the 
adjustment of the variables is much slower. After an immediate change in the first two years, 
the labour market tightness and the unemployment rate slowly approach their steady state 
values, which are reached after about 35 to 45 years. The tax rate follows the decreasing 
unemployment rate. As in the low risk aversion case, the interest rate takes the longest time to 
come down to its new level. 
 


































































































(d) unemployment rate 
 
Table 13 shows the outcome of a vote on the optimal defined benefit system when agents 
correctly anticipate the transition process to the new long-rung equilibrium. These results are 
quite different from the fifty-something percent vote in favour of the optimal policies derived 
above under the assumption that the economy immediately jumps to the new steady-state. 
Now, the outcome is not only quantitatively different between the three cases, it changes 
qualitatively. In the low risk aversion case, the approval of 65% for the alternative policy is - 32 - 
very clear cut. At the other extreme, in the high risk aversion case, a 52% majority of the 
voters now rejects the optimal system. The γ=2 scenario with a 57.1% vote for the alternative 
policy lies somewhere in the middle. 
 
Table 13: Approval for policy switch to optimal unemployment system, accounting for transition period. 
approval for optimal policy  case 
γ=1  γ=2  γ=3 
opt. def. benefit  65.1%  57.1%  47.6% 
 
This change of the voting outcome compared to the case when the transition period is ignored 
is mainly caused by two effects working in opposite directions. Firstly, as the interest rate 
only decreases very slowly, the expected income loss for older (i.e. wealthier) workers 
compared to the status quo is small. This makes the policy switch more acceptable for agents 
who are close to their retirement age. Secondly, as the employment prospects only improve 
gradually and the tax rate also needs some time to reach its low steady state value, but the 
benefits immediately drop to their new level, some working age agents may find the optimal 
policy less appealing when they account for the transitional dynamics.
10 
Figure 4 shows the different voting outcomes with and without taking the transition into 
account by age and employment status. In case of low risk aversion, both the market tightness 
and the tax rate jump to their new equilibrium vales immediately after the policy change. 
Only the interest rate needs some time to adjust. As a consequence, the voting behaviour is 
almost the same whether or not the transitional dynamics are considered, except for workers 
older than 60 years, who approve the optimal policy if the interest rate decreases only slowly. 
In the γ=2 case this effect is present, too, though less pronounced. Also, a much smaller share 
of the unemployed agents votes for the regime switch if accounting for the transition effects. 
Finally, if the adjustment process is considered in the high risk aversion case, most 
unemployed agents reject the unemployment insurance reform. Moreover, even a significant 
share of young employees vote against the optimal system. As the gradual adjustment of the 
                                                 
10 Retirees are still worse off if the regime switch is made. There is only one exception: In the first year after the 
policy change in the low risk aversion case, the interest rate is slightly above its previous level. Therefore, a 
group of agents older then 77 years, representing 3.6% of the population, now vote for the optimal policy in this 
case. - 33 - 
interest rate only has a small influence on the voting behaviour of older workers, the optimal 
unemployment insurance system is now rejected by the majority of the voters. 
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4. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper presented a general equilibrium heterogeneous agent model with search 
unemployment and individual productivities that depend on the employment history. The 
model was calibrated to the German economy, using a simplified version unemployment 
insurance system in place until 2004 as the base case. Two basic types of alternative UI 
systems were considered, one with defined benefits and one with defined replacement ratios. 
Both systems allow for three different benefit levels, one for the first six months of an 
unemployment spell, one for months seven to twelve, and one for durations beyond one year. 
The welfare maximising UI systems were computed for different levels of risk aversion and 
for a closed and an open economy. Looking at the results, several patterns emerge. Firstly, the 
defined benefit systems was superior to the defined replacement ratio systems in terms of 
welfare in all cases considered. Secondly, while optimal benefits for long-term unemployed - 34 - 
individuals increase with the level of risk aversion, they are never very high. For a relative 
risk aversion of 3, the long-run benefit is about 30% of the average income, and the 
replacement ratio is 40%. Thirdly, the benefits paid to unemployed during the first year of the 
spell very low in the closed economy, where they have a negative external effect on aggregate 
saving and thus the capital stock, but can be quite high in the open economy. Finally, there is 
a considerable potential for welfare improvements by switching to the optimal UI system, 
even abolishing the whole status quo insurance would result in welfare gains. 
As the next step, it was asked whether a majority of the population would support switching 
from the current UI system with relatively high replacement ratios to the optimal policy. 
When voters can choose between the long-run equilibria associated with the current and the 
alternative policy, the majority votes for the regime change. In the closed economy case, the 
approval for the optimal policy is just above 50%, regardless of the level of risk-aversion 
assumed. There are basically two important demographic groups who oppose the policy 
change, namely old agents (retired individuals and older workers), who would suffer interest 
income losses under the optimal policy, and young agents with low resources, who might 
have difficulties maintaining an adequate consumption level in some states if the optimal 
system was imposed. In the open economy cases, almost the whole population supports the 
optimal UI system. 
Finally, the transitional dynamics after the introduction of an optimal unemployment 
insurance scheme were analysed. The speed of adjustment to the new steady-state equilibrium 
varies strongly between the low and high risk aversion scenarios considered. In the latter case, 
the change of the labour market variables takes very long. In all simulations, the adjustment of 
the interest rate was very slow. When agents take this transition process into account, the 
voting outcome looks different: In the low risk aversion case, the approval for the reform is 
increased from about 50% to almost two thirds, whereas in the high risk aversion scenario, the 
majority of the voters now opposes the optimal system. 
This paper contributes to the literature by incorporating a history dependent individual 
productivity parameter in a heterogeneous agents model with search unemployment in the 
spirit of Costain (1999). The model thus not only captures the (negative) moral hazard effects 
of unemployment insurance, it also values the consumption insurance effect to a higher 
degree than models that do not allow for permanent income shocks. 
A central message of this paper is that transitional effects after a policy change may be quite 
important. It was shown that taking these effects into account can qualitatively change the - 35 - 
outcome of a vote on an alternative policy. The same might be true of welfare comparisons of 
alternative policies, when a utilitarian welfare measure is employed. 
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